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By Mario COCCIAa†  
 
Abstract. The purpose of this paper is an introduction to methods for conducting inquiries 
in social sciences. A method of inquiry is an organized and systematic scientific approaches 
used by scholars for controlled investigations and experiments to efficiently solve 
theoretical and practical problems, generating discoveries and/or science advances. The 
paper here presents, briefly, the development of models of inquiry in the philosophy of 
science. After that, it introduces general methods of inquiry (deduction, induction, 
abduction and hypothetical-deductive approaches) and specific models of scientific inquiry 
in social sciences, such as multiple working hypotheses. In general, modern scientific 
research is multifaceted and requires different approaches for generating new concepts, new 
hypothesis and theories. Different methods of inquiry directed to solve problems in science 
can be complementary approaches that foster knowledge creation within and between 
research fields. 
Keywords. Methods of inquiry, Philosophy of science, Models of inquiry, Scientific 
research, Conduct of inquiry. 
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1. Introduction 
o understand science today, it is important to understand its methods of 
inquiry. Such models indicate how the future of scientific fields can be 
investigated and developed. Methods of scientific inquiry generally aim to 
obtain knowledge in the form of testable explanations that scientists can use to 
predict the results of future phenomena in nature and society (Popper, 1959). In 
particular, main elements of the methods of inquiry in a hypothetic deductive view 
are: a) observation and accurate measures of the subject of scientific inquiry; b) 
hypothetical explanations of the subject of inquiry; c) controlled experiment for 
testing the hypotheses; d) predictioni. Next sections, will trace the development of 
methods of inquiry based on scientific thinking of rationalism and empiricism, the 
first two major (and opposed) philosophies of science. Subsequently, a synthesis of 
these conflicting positions by Kant is discussed. After that, it will be traced the 
development of the major contemporary theories of methods of scientific inquiry: 
the speculative metaphysical, the positivistic, and the pragmatic (cf. Kaplan, 2009; 
West Churchman & Ackoff, 1950).  
 
2. Development of the methods of scientific inquiry in the 
philosophy of science  
2.1. Rationalism: The role of reason in science 
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The school of rationalism argues that the development of reason is a basic 
faculty in the method of inquiry. In this approach, the Greek mathematicians had 
the purpose to systematize the general properties of space (i.e., geometry).  
Reason was a faculty that had two fundamental features: it provides information 
concerning the essences of things, and it shows how to go from these essences to 
other characteristics of the world.  Reason provides "clear and distinct" ideas, and 
guides to the conclusions from such ideas. The history of science and philosophy 
seems to show that it is no easy matter to identify the clear and distinct ideas. 
Leibniz attempted to overcome this difficulty by making analytic statements the 
beginning point of rational inquiry that cannot be denied without violating the Law 
of Contradiction. A problem in this approach is to connect pure formal defining to 
reality marked a turning point in man's thoughts on the correct process of scientific 
inquiry. Some contemporary scholars have attempted to use rational methods of 
inquiry in some scientific fields, but the modern rational method does not always 
provide truth. However, speculation and the clear use of reason are essentially the 
only methods at scholar's disposal in certain areas, such as religion, morality, and 
metaphysics (West Churchman & Ackoff, 1950). 
 
2.2. Empiricism: The role of observation in science 
The priority of reason was questioned and attacked by the empiricism that 
replaced reason by sensation as the source of all knowledge. Locke made the first 
comprehensive and systematic attempt to do this. Starting from simple ideas, and 
with the aid of the mental operations of compounding, relating, and abstracting, he 
sought to show how other facts (ideas) could be derived. He also tried to show how 
knowledge of general propositions should be derived by the process of comparing 
ideas. This approach by Locke was seriously challenged by the later philosophers 
who accepted his general program. 
Berkeley and Hume showed that many ideas which appeared simple to Locke, 
were actually not so, and consequently they raised the problem of the adequacy of 
intuition or introspection as a criterion of simplicity. Locke's notion of a mental 
faculty of abstraction was refuted by Berkeley, who claimed that the mind can only 
perform generalizations, not abstractions, whereas Hume discards the faculty of 
generalization. Berkeley eliminates Locke's material substance, and bases all 
reality in mental substance. Reid and Hume show that not even the existence of a 
mental substance can be proved on empirical grounds. Hume also demonstrated our 
inability to assert any causal connections with certainty. Hence, knowledge is 
replaced by belief: the empirical analysis can only show with certainly our 
impressions. 
 
2.3. A synthesis of reason and observation by Kant 
Kant shows that both sensory observation and general understanding are 
essential for meaningful experience. It is true that there is something given in 
sensation (the sensuous intuition), but in addition to the sensuous intuition, Kant 
argues that both space and time are a priori forms of experience, which are 
necessary to individuate objects. In this approach, the mind must bring to its 
experience a principle of regularity. That is, the natural world is well ordered 
because this is the manner in which the mind makes understandable its sensuous 
intuitions.  
 
2.4. Modern rationalism: The speculative method 
Rationalism since Kant has turned from the rigorous method of deductive 
science. The newer rationalism shares with the old the belief that the mind can 
intuitively grasp truth; but for the newer rationalism, truth comes only at the end of 
the process, and very tentatively. Rational or metaphysical truth, in short, is derived 
by a process in which the generalizations come out of rich experience, but are not 
themselves mere mechanical inductions or deductions, but creative acts of the 
mind. For Hegel, the process was dialectical, proceeding from conflicts and 
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working up by successive syntheses to some higher and richer stage. For Bergson, 
the process is intuitive. For Hall, it is imaginative insight. Finally, the modern 
rationalist claims that his method is in some sense basic to all others, and that other 
methods must always make metaphysical, or ethical assumptions that can only be 
justified by rational insight, intuition, faith, and the like. 
 
2.5. The positivistic method 
The development of the contemporary analysis of scientific method, called 
"logical positivism‛, is due to Hume with an attack on speculative metaphysics, 
which became the cornerstone of Comte's positive philosophy. Comte attempted to 
demonstrate that metaphysical thinking represented an intermediate historical stage 
through which man passed on his way to the full maturity of positive or scientific 
thought. Further, he constructed a hierarchy of sciences based on the temporal 
order and logical simplicity in the appearance of the special scientific disciplines. 
This notion of a hierarchy appears in new guise in logical positivism, as the theory 
of physicalism. In this approach, Mill attempted to show how by designing 
experience, causal connections could be established on purely empirical grounds. 
Mill, in effect, defined the problem of ‚inductive logic‛. Finally, Mach and Pearson 
conceived of law as an economic measure, a way of summarizing past experiences 
and of indicating expectations. Laws were not taken as irrefutable, exact, or as 
representing necessary connections in nature. They were merely taken as 
provisional cataloguing instruments.  
 
2.6. The method of logical positivism 
Logical positivism is a new empiricism, which unlike its predecessor, uses 
logical rather than psychological analyses as an instrument for the study of 
scientific method. It takes the understanding of language in terms of its form 
(syntax), content (semantics), and uses (pragmatics) to be basic to an understanding 
of methodological problems. It attempts to show how language construction can 
take place from a basic set of elements and rules. Such a language can be 
considered quite apart from any factual meaning. Meanings are fundamentally 
assigned by means of linguistic rules referring ultimately to protocol statements, 
which are more or less directly verified in experience. Explanation and prediction 
can then be given precise definitions as aspects of scientific method. 
 
2.7. Modern synthesis: The pragmatic method 
Science, in the pragmatic approach, is conceived, not in terms of what it 
actually does, but in terms of its aims. In the pattern of inquiry (due to Dewey), the 
emphasis is on the resolution of an indeterminate situation into a determinate one. 
The idea is that facts and concepts are instruments for certain types of action, and 
have no meaning apart from this context. 
In order to consider the meaning of science in a more precise sense, pragmatism 
introduces the distinction between goals (which are presumably attainable 
objectives) and ideals (which are unattainable but approachable within any limits). 
The ideal which defines science is that of finding perfect means for any end in any 
situation. In so far as activity furthers man in his struggle for this ideal, it is 
scientific. A classification of sub-ideals represents steps in the pattern of science's 
progress that must be approached as science itself progresses.  
Finally, pragmatism's attitude toward metaphysics and positivism is that they 
represent partial (and often fruitful) methods, none of which are final in 
themselves.  
 
3. General models of inquiry 
Considering the philosophies of science discussed above, models of scientific 
inquiry can be classical, pragmatic and logical empiricism approachesii:  
* The classical model of scientific inquiry derives from Aristotle, who 
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distinguished the forms of approximate and exact reasoning. A common distinction 
in science is between logical paths of induction and deduction. The etymology is 
from the Latin verb ducere, to draw on or along, to lead, and with the Latin 
propensity for prefixes. With the prefixes in and de, meaning ‘in’ and ‘from,’ 
respectively, both words may have many meanings. Simply, to induce could mean 
‘to lead or draw into, to infer, to persuade,’ and induction is ‘to lead to the 
conclusion’. To deduce could mean ‘to lead from, to draw from’ and deduction is 
‘to draw a conclusion from’. Both terms define systems of logic with the purpose 
of solving problems.  
Deductive methodof inquiry is based on deduction: ‚inference by reasoning 
from generals to particulars,‛ or ‚the process of deducing from something known 
or assumed‛. Deductive reasoning, also deductive logic, is the process of reasoning 
from one or more statements (premises) to reach a logically certain conclusion. Put 
otherwise, deductive reasoning goes in the same direction as that of the 
conditionals, and links premises with conclusions. If all premises are true, the 
terms are clear, and the rules of deductive logic are followed, then the conclusion 
reached is necessarily true. Deductive reasoning (top-down logic) contrasts with 
inductive reasoning (bottom-up logic).  
Inductive model of inquiry starts by doing experiments and then derives 
theories from the data. This process collects data and then move to theoretical 
implications. Scholars are involved in a continuous loop of data collection and 
theory formation. Problem solving in scientific fields leads to a diversity of 
induction: formation of hypotheses (HPs), the need to test HPs supports the study 
design and controlled experimental activity: experiments, in turn, can generate 
consequential problems to be solved, which lead to new hypotheses and further 
science advances (e.g., in medicine the study of mutant cancers; cf., Coccia, 2016). 
Induction is riskier than deduction because it can lead to conclusions that may be 
uncertain. Overall, then, while the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, 
the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon 
the evidence given. Inductive reasoning can be a derivation of general principles 
from specific observations, though some sources disagree with this usage.  
* Pragmatic model by Charles Sanders Peirce (1992) characterized inquiry a 
‘struggle’ to replace doubt with ‘settled belief’. The method of science is an 
experimental method, and the application of the pragmatist maximiii reveals how 
hypotheses can be subject to experimental test. Dewey's conception of inquiry, 
found in his Logic: the Theory of Inquiry is to understand a problem through 
describing its elements and identifying their relations. Identifying a concrete 
question that we need to answer is a sign that we are already making progress: ‘the 
controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is 
so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the 
elements of the original situation into a unified whole’ (Deway, 1938, pp.104-105). 
As Smith (1978, p. 98) has put it: ‘Peirce aimed at ‚fixing‛ belief, whereas Dewey 
aimed at ‚fixing‛ the situation.’  Peirce calls his pragmatism "the logic of 
abduction". 
Abduction by Peirce is based on simple visualization of phenomena. In fact, 
many visual stimuli are impoverished or ambiguous, people are adept at imposing 
order on them, creating hypotheses to explain what has been observed. Hence, 
abductive reasoning (also called abduction, abductive inference, or retroduction) is 
a form of logical inference which starts with an observation then seeks to find the 
simplest and most likely explanation. In abductive reasoning, unlike deductive 
reasoning, the premises do not guarantee the conclusion. Abductive reasoning is an 
inference to the best explanation, although not all uses of the terms abduction and 
inference to the best explanation are exactly equivalent.   
* Logical empiricism is based on a set of axioms in formal deductive systems. 
Theories are confirmed by deducing their effects from axioms and checking to see 
whether the predictions hold; this model of inquiry is called hypothetico-deductive 
because it uses the hypotheses to make predictions, rather than the derivation of 
Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences 
JSAS, 5(2), M. Coccia, p.116-126. 
120 
laws from observations, similarly to earlier empiricism (Hempel, 1965). Put 
otherwise, scholars with hypothetico-deductive method of inquiry state hypotheses 
and then do experiments to test them. In most scientific fields, the hypothetico-
deductive method of scientific inquiry by Popper is the dominant model of inquiry. 
The approach by Popper (1959) was hypothetic deductive, however he saw the 
critical role of prediction to be the attempt to falsify theories, not to confirm them 
(cf., Thagard, 1993, p.192ff). For instance, in psychology and other social sciences, 
scholars state a hypothesis underpinned in a theoretical framework, then describe 
the materials and experimental methods, results achieved and finally discuss how 
experimental results bear on the initial hypothesis for possible predictions. This 
approach can generate distortion of the process of inquiry because it may be 
possible to form a sharp hypothesis and then test it with empirical evidence. The 
general hypothetico-deductive scheme can be synthetized in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Hypothetico-deductive scheme. Adapted from Thagard (1993, p.192). 
 
Hanson (1958) criticized this model of inquiry because theory and observation 
were much more intertwined. Scientific realism argues that science is not restricted 
to observable facts but knowledge can be achieved of what is not observable.  
* Finally, analogy has a vital value in the evolution of science because the 
solution of problems in one scientific field—source domain — can be used for 
solving and explaining problems in another scientific field -target domain 
(Oppenheimer, 1955). 
 
4. Specific methods of inquiry in social sciences  
In the general background of the models of inquiry just mentioned, some 
specific methods in social sciences are as followsiv.  
 
4.1. Game theory  
Among the social and human sciences a method of inquiry is the game theory. 
A "game" is any activity with the structure of a contest, in which what one player 
decides to do, simultaneously or not simultaneously, depends on what it expects to 
be done by the other players. The specific content of the actions involved is 
irrelevant; all that matters is the payoff to the players associated with each possible 
combination of moves by the two sides. In this way utility theory also enters into 
the analysis. The game model thus serves for a wide variety of decision-making 
behaviour, particularly where it is supposed that a rational choice is done among 
alternative strategies of action. Accordingly, it has been applied to economic 
bargaining, political negotiation, the conduct of war, battle of the sexes, etc. 
Characteristic of game theory is the application of probability considerations to the 
choice of strategies. What is especially remarkable about this class of models of 
inquiry is that the mathematics used is essentially so elementary, while the 
behaviour to which the models usefully apply is complex (Watson, 2002).  
 
4.2. Multi-agent programmable modelling environment with NetLogo 
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NetLogo is an agent-based programming language and integrated modelling 
environment. The NetLogo environment enables exploration of complex 
phenomena. It comes with an extensive models library including models in a 
variety of domains, such as economics, biology, physics, chemistry, psychology, 
system dynamics. NetLogo allows exploration by modifying switches, sliders, 
choosers, inputs, and other interface elements. NetLogo is in use in a wide variety 
of scientific fields (Railsback & Grimm, 2011). 
 
4.3. Experimental approach in social science     
It is a research method that aims to contribute to the understanding of human 
behaviour by means of controlled laboratory experiments (Vernon Smith, 2008). 
Data collected in experiments are used to estimate effect, test the validity of 
theories, and explore market mechanisms. Experiments usually use cash to 
motivate subjects, in order to mimic real-world incentives. Experiments are used to 
understand how and why markets and other exchange systems function as they do. 
Experiments may be conducted in the field or in laboratory settings, whether of 
individual or group behaviour. Variants of the subject outside such formal confines 
include natural and quasi-natural experiments. 
 
4.4. Counterfactual methods of causation 
Counterfactual method of causation is that the meaning of causal claims can be 
explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form ‚If A had not 
occurred, C would not have occurred‛. While counterfactual analyses have been 
given of type-causal concepts, most counterfactual analyses have focused on 
singular causal or token-causal claims of the form ‚event C caused event E‛. The 
best known counterfactual analysis of causation is Lewis's (1973) theory. However, 
intense discussion over forty years has cast doubt on the adequacy of any simple 
analysis of singular causation in terms of counterfactuals. Current studies have seen 
a proliferation of different refinements of the basic idea to achieve a closer match 
with commonsense judgements about causation (Collin et al., 2004). 
 
4.5. Multiple Working Hypotheses 
The method of multiple working hypotheses (MWH) involves the development, 
prior to our research, of several hypotheses that might explain the phenomenon 
under study (Chamberlin, 1897). Many of these hypotheses will be contradictory, 
so that some, if not all, will prove to be false. However, the development of 
multiple hypotheses prior to the research allows us avoid the trap of the ruling 
hypothesis and thus makes it more likely that our research will lead to meaningful 
results. Hence, MWH method suggests all the possible explanations of the 
phenomenon to be studied, including the possibility that none of explanations are 
correct and the possibility that some new explanation may emerge. The method of 
multiple working hypotheses has several beneficial effects because a phenomenon 
is the result of several causes, not just one; the method of multiple working 
hypotheses also analyses the interaction of the several causes. The method also 
promotes much greater thoroughness than research directed toward one hypothesis, 
leading to lines of inquiry that scholars might otherwise overlook. 
The method of multiple working hypotheses can have drawbacks. One is that it 
is impossible to express multiple hypotheses simultaneously, and thus there is a 
natural tendency to let one take primacy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Methods of inquiry consider that science advances are essentially due to 
individual scientists who solve problems, form hypotheses, and do controlled 
experiments. However, modern science is more and more performed by 
communities of scholars with international collaboration (Coccia & Wang, 2016). 
The modern methods of inquiry include many phases in the process of scientific 
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research: study concept, study design and working hypotheses formation, 
acquisition of data, experiments, analysis and interpretation of data, drafting 
manuscripts, statistical analyses, critical revision of the project for important 
intellectual content, obtained funding, administrative, technical and material 
support and supervision. These complex phases can be distributed across 
individuals and/or communities of scientist worldwide (e.g., in medicine, 
astronomy, etc.). Overall, then, modern science is based on a variety of models of 
inquiry: some scholars focus on history, others on logical analyses, some continue 
to apply empiricism and state that science advances are concerned with truth only 
with respect to what can be observed. In general, scientific discovery in modern 
research fields is multifaceted, requiring diverse processes for generating concepts, 
for creating new hypothesis and performing controlled experiments. In conclusion, 
induction, deduction and other methods of inquiry are usually different approaches 
but never contradictory, often they are complementary tools that facilitate problem 




i For applications of different methods of inquiry in the studies of technology, sources of innovation 
and management of public research labs, cf., Calabrese et al., 2005; Cariola & Coccia, 2004; 
Cavallo et al., 2014, 2014a, 2015; Coccia, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 
2006a, 2007, 2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2009a, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2011, 
2012, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 2013a, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 
2014g, 2015, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 
2017d, 2018, Coccia & Bozeman, 2016; Coccia & Finardi, 2012, 2013; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 
2016; Coccia & Cadario, 2014; Coccia et al., 2015, 2012, Coccia & Rolfo, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 
2007, 2010, 2010, 2013; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 2016; Rolfo & Coccia, 2005. 
ii See references for application of some of these methods of inquiry in social and human sciences. 
iii Peirce's canonical statement of his maxim in ‘How to Make our Ideas Clear’ is: ‚Consider what 
effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception 
to have. Then, our conception of those effects is the whole of our conception of the object‛. (Peirce, 
1992).  
iv See references for application of some of these methods of inquiry in social and human sciences, 
such as: Benati & Coccia, 2017; Calabrese et al., 2005; Cariola & Coccia, 2004; Cavallo et al., 
2014, 2014a, 2015; Coccia, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2006, 2006a, 2007, 
2008, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2009a, 2010, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e, 2011, 2012, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2013, 2013a, 2014, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f, 2014g, 2015, 
2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2016, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2018, 
Coccia & Bozeman, 2016; Coccia & Finardi, 2012, 2013; Coccia & Wang, 2015, 2016; Coccia & 
Cadario, 2014; Coccia et al., 2015, 2012, Coccia & Rolfo, 2000, 2002, 2009, 2012, 2007, 2010, 
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